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MECHANISM TO SPEED UP SECURE COMMUNICATION HANDSHAKES IN 
CONSTRAINED CONDITIONS 
 







It is desirable to speed up secure tunnel negotiations in constrained mediums where 
numerous clients are "competing" to form secure connections to destination servers or 
endpoints.  In support of that objective, techniques are presented herein that minimize the 
authentication data that is transferred within encrypted tunnel handshakes under 
constrained conditions where the data can introduce unacceptable slowness or failures.  The 
techniques may apply to Internet of Things (IoT) constrained environments in which 
bandwidth is sparse and multiple devices are competing for bandwidth.  The techniques 
may also be used on the Internet with post-quantum algorithms, which can introduce 
unnecessary slowness due to their long keys and signatures.  Other environments that may 
benefit include, for example, a Wireless Smart Utility Network (Wi-Sun) network, an 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) technical standard 802.15.4 
network, virtual private networks (VPNs) and Zero-Trust Access networks, Web 
acceleration or proxy functions, etc. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
It is desirable to speed up secure tunnel negotiations in constrained mediums where 
numerous clients are "competing" to form secure connections to destination servers or 
endpoints.  In such cases, sometimes establishing a connection and completing a 
transaction can take minutes or even hours depending upon the medium and the number of 
endpoints. 
One example is an IEEE mesh network that typically involves utilities and smart 
cities verticals.  As described in the IEEE technical standard 802.15.4, a mesh network 
traditionally uses 900 megahertz (MHz) radio frequencies in a channel about 75 kilobits 
per second (Kbps).  As illustrated in Figure 1, below, mesh network traffic often aggregates 
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to a mesh aggregation point like a connected grid router (CGR).  Traditionally, these 
networks can be lossy with a relatively high loss probability. When there is loss or a failed 
transaction attempt, an endpoint backs off for some period of time to prevent further 
lockups due to contention and then tries the transaction again.  As there may be thousands 
of endpoints and the aggregating link may be the bottleneck, it can sometimes take an 
endpoint minutes or even hours to establish a successful connection. 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustrative Mesh Network 
 
Connections typically involve secure tunnels that offer data privacy and 
authentication.  For example, sometimes these are Constrained Application Protocol 
(CoAP) transactions running over a Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) or a 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) – i.e., a (D)TLS – connection.  Ideally, these connections 
should succeed the first time in order to speed up the transactions in the whole network. 
Another example is a Wi-SUN mesh network in which endpoints employ 
Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) based mutual 
authentication.  Although a number of Wi-SUN mesh devices may be Full Function 
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Devices (FFDs) – i.e., not power constrained – there are also Limited Function Devices 
(LFDs) that are battery powered.  Battery powered devices often have extremely 
challenging requirements.  For example, such devices typically need to operate on two AA 
batteries (offering, for example, a capacity of 2000 milliamp hour (mAh)) and be able to 
last up to 20 years.  That means they are extremely sensitive, with the total number of 
packet transmissions being the most energy consuming operation that they perform over 
their 20 year lifetime.  Additionally, in a Wi-SUN environment each node performs 
periodic re-authentication thus multiplying the impact of excessive data exchanges.  Any 
reduction in the number of packets that are transmitted or re-transmitted, or in packet sizes, 
is extremely desirable for Wi-SUN LFDs.  Although FFDs don’t have power constraints, 
and as such can communicate frequently or longer, there are still benefits to applying 
approaches described herein to FFDs, as otherwise they consume more of the precious air-
time, making less of the air-time available to the “application.” 
An expensive aspect of secure connections ((D)TLS or other) in terms of data is 
typically authentication (based on, for example, a public key infrastructure (PKI)).  For 
example, a connection using elliptic-curve cryptography, which is the norm in constrained 
environments, usually employs 32 byte (B) ephemeral keys (Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman), 
32 byte hashes (e.g., Secure Hash Algorithm 2 (SHA-2)) or 16 byte authentication tags 
(e.g., 128 bit Advanced Encryption Standard-Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM)).  A 
(Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA)) certificate chain of a secure tunnel could add up to 2 
kilobytes (KB) in each direction, which could result in a significant amount of data trying 
to pass over a 75Kbps pipe when considering a large number (maybe thousands) of 
endpoints.  Figure 2, below, illustrates such an example secure channel handshake 
exchange. 
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Figure 2: Illustrative Exchanges 
 
Additionally, in a constrained environment with small size packets sending 2KB of 
data could consume five or six packets or more.  The loss probability is 1 - (1-p)n, where n 
is the number of packets and p is the loss probability per packet.  Using a conservative 
value of p=10% loss probability per packet in a constrained environment yields a 65% loss 
probability when 2KB are sent over n=5 packets in each direction.  That would exacerbate 
the issue by causing, possibly among other things, slowdowns, retransmissions, and 
network contention. 
It is desirable to shrink the authentication data sent as much as possible in order to 
alleviate the mesh network load, convey fewer packets with a better success probability, 
and experience faster connections. 
Additionally, consideration must be given to the post-quantum algorithms being 
standardized in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Post-Quantum 
Cryptography (PQC) Project (currently in Round 3).  Some of those algorithms (mainly 
lattices) offer decent performance but the amount of data is significant.  Specifically, the 
Dilithium signature algorithm finalist offers good performance but also has 3-4KB size 
keys and signatures which when used in secure tunnels (e.g., (D)TLS) would significantly 
increase the size of authentication data.  For example, it could result in over 10KB of 
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"authentication data" in each direction.  The effect that such algorithms could have on 
constrained mediums like IEEE technical standard 802.15.4 mesh networks would be 
detrimental.  But even a regular Internet connection would slow down significantly due to 
the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) congestion control algorithm as was shown in an 
NDSS 2020 Research paper (https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/071 ).  Thus, shrinking the amount 
of data transferred is even more critical in a post-quantum future. 
To address these challenges, techniques are presented herein that support enhanced 
exchanges that may be utilized to minimize authentication data transferred via the 
exchanges.  It is important to note that the presented techniques do not change the 
authentication handshake itself, which would have implications on widely used protocols, 
such as (D)TLS.  Instead, since the largest chunk of the authentication data (i.e., a 
certificate chain) is repetitive in a handshake, aspects of the techniques presented herein 
suppress sending the intermediate certificate authorities (CAs) and root CA certificates in 
the certificate chain as shown in Figure 3, below.  This decreases the "authentication data" 
to only one certificate and one handshake signature instead of two to four certificates 
(depending on the certificate chain) and a handshake signature.  Such a decrease can 
amount to over a 50% drop in the total "authentication data" or several KB in absolute size. 
 
 
Figure 3: Enhanced Exchanges 
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Aspects of the techniques presented herein encompass a number of elements that 
are of particular interest and note.  Various of those elements will be described and 
discussed below. 
A first element of interest and note concerns the caching of the peer certificate chain. 
In order to omit the cert chain and shrink the “authentication data” the peer certificate chain 
needs to be cached. The caching algorithm is responsible for maintaining a cache of the 
CAs in the peer certificate chain.  Most IoT endpoints communicate with a limited number 
of nodes or controllers, thus, the caching algorithm is not expected to update the cache too 
frequently. Other use-cases like Web browsing would require more frequent cache updates. 
A cache consists of multiple CA certificates linked to a specific destination that the 
endpoint communicates with along with a timestamp.  A portion of an exemplary cache is 
presented in Table 1, below. 
 
Destination CAs linked list Timestamp 
Peer 1 ICA1‐1, ICA1‐2, RootCA1 Nov 17, 2020, 10:30am 
Peer 2 ICA2‐1, ICA2‐2, RootCA2 Nov 16, 2020, 9:00am 
. . .  . . .  . . .  
Table 1: Aspects of Exemplary Cache 
 
In accordance with techniques of this disclosure, the cache update algorithm would 
update the cache when there is an unknown destination (i.e., a cache miss).  If the cache 
was full, then the algorithm would remove the oldest cache entry and add the new one.  In 
pseudocode form aspects of the algorithm may be expressed as: 
 
if (destination entry exists in the cache) then     
   update the timestamp in the destination cache entry    
   continue to the handshake by notifying the peer to suppress the CAs (step 2 below)  
else 
   initiate a traditional handshake (without notifying the peer to suppress the CAs) 
   after the handshake is complete, get the peer CA certificates from it     
   if (the cache is full) then        
      remove the oldest entry from the cache (to make room for the new entry)    
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   add the new CA certificates from the most recent handshake 
 
It is important to note that more complicated cache update algorithms are possible 
that could take into consideration, for example, the frequency of the handshakes or the size 
of each peer's CA certificates. 
A second element of interest and note regarding the techniques presented herein 
concerns notifying the client or the server that they do not need to send their certificate 
chain because it is already cached.   
The client-to-server and the server-to-client certificate chain suppression 
notification needs to comply with the existing protocol handshake in order to ensure ease 
of deployment.  This may be achieved through a number of different approaches.  Various 
of those approaches are described and discussed below. 
Approach I.  A covert channel in the (D)TLS handshake may be used which would 
not violate the protocol or compromise its security.  The ClientHello and ServerHello that 
are used in the handshake to exchange keying material include a 32 byte (256 bit) opaque 
value (i.e., a random nonce) which is used to protect from replay attacks.  Such values may 
be used to signal the certificate chain suppression.  A client may tell a server that they do 
not want its certificate chain in its ClientHello.random value and the server reflects same 
in its ServerHello.random value.  To accomplish this the client or server will overload a 
few (e.g., four) bits out of the 256 bits in the value.  The rest of the random value will not 
change at all. The client or server uses a predetermined byte to point to the bits which will 
show its preference.  For example, assume that the predetermined byte is byte number 27.  
If the random byte number 27 of the nonce is 0x19 (25 in base 10) then the client or server 
will flip bits number 25 through 28 of its (ClientHello or ServerHello) random nonce to 0 
if it wants the peer certificate chain suppressed, as shown in Figure 5, below. 
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Figure 5: Illustrative Suppression Approach 
 
Note, that this approach sacrifices four bits of randomness out of the 256 bits of the 
random value and thus has no security implication.  TLS 1.3 sacrifices 64 bits of 
randomness to prevent TLS downgrade attacks by hardcoding the last 8 bytes of the nonce.  
Also note that this method has 1/2^4 or a 6.3% probability of false suppression which will 
lead to a failed handshake and a new attempt.  If such a probability (i.e., 6.3%) is inadequate 
then the failure probability may be altered by changing the number of bits from four to, for 
example, six or more.  It is important to recognize that this approach is backwards 
compatible with existing implementations.  If an endpoint has not been upgraded to support 
certificate suppression, then it will simply treat the nonce as a nonce and never omit the 
certificate chain, resulting in everything working as before. 
Approach II.  A client or a server could also use the certificate_authorities extension 
that is defined in RFC 6347 (for (D)TLS 1.2) and RFC 8446 (for (D)TLS 1.3) in its 
ClientHello or Server CertificateRequest, respectively.  As stated in the standards -- "The 
client MAY send the certificate_authorities extension in the ClientHello message. The 
server MAY send it in the CertificateRequest message."  In reality, these extensions are 
rarely used today on the Internet or in IEEE technical standard 802.15.4 networks or in Wi-
Sun environments.  According to the standards -- "the certificate_authorities extension is 
used to indicate the certificate authorities (CAs) which an endpoint supports and which 
SHOULD be used by the receiving endpoint to guide certificate selection. [...] The body of 
the certificate_authorities extension consists of a list of the distinguished names [X501] of 
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acceptable certificate authorities [..] These distinguished names specify a desired 
distinguished name for a trust anchor or subordinate CA; thus, this message can be used to 
describe known trust anchors as well as a desired authorization space."   
Thus, the client or server could signal the cached CAs that it does not need a 
certificate chain from its peer and the peer will suppress them in its response.  It is important 
to recognize that this approach is backwards compatible with existing implementations.  If 
an endpoint has not been upgraded to support this mechanism, then the standards are not 
violated and the peer will never omit the certificate chain, resulting in everything working 
as before. 
Additionally, combining Approach I and Approach II (as described above) ensures 
that there is no false certificate chain suppression.  Using both mechanisms together can 
also provide assurance to the peer that the client or server indeed has cached the 
intermediate CA cert since their names are included in the certificate authorities extension. 
Approach III.  Alternatively, only when (D)TLS 1.3 is employed, a: 
 client may use the tls_flags extension that is defined in the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF) Internet-Draft draft-ietf-tls-tlsflags (originally used in the 
now expired IETF Internet-Dract draft-thomson-tls-sic).  The flag value will be 
in the range 64 through 79 (which are reserved for private use) or in the range 
80 through 2039 (which are available for specific environments or national and 
corporate extensions).  The flag may be used to signal a client's preference for 
certificate suppression.  For example, the client could use the value 65 to signal 
to the server that it does not need the certificate chain.  It is important to 
recognize that this method is backwards compatible with existing 
implementations.  If an endpoint has not been upgraded to support this 
mechanism, then the standards are not violated and the server will never omit 
the certificate chain, resulting in everything working as before. 
 server may use the certificate_request_context in the CertificateRequest 
extension that is defined in TLS 1.3 (see RFC 8446) and DTLS 1.3 (see the 
IETF Internet-Dract draft-ietf-tls-dtls13).  According to the standards, the 
certificate_request_context is "an opaque string which identifies the certificate 
request and which will be echoed in the client's Certificate message. The 
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certificate_request_context MUST be unique within the scope of this 
connection (thus preventing replay of client CertificateVerify messages)."  The 
server could signal its preference to not receive the certificate chain from the 
client by overloading the certificate_request_context and copying selected 
bytes from its ServerHello.random nonce.  The nonce is unique and the client 
could deduce the server's intentions by just checking for it in the 
certificate_request_context.  It is important to recognize that this method is 
backwards compatible with existing implementations.  If an endpoint has not 
been upgraded to support this mechanism, then the standards are not violated 
and the client will never omit the certificate chain, resulting in everything 
working as before. 
Approach IV.  A special configuration on the client and the server could ensure that 
neither the client nor the server sends its certificate chain to the peer.  Of course, this 
configuration will ensure that the endpoints are pre-loaded with the certificate chains so 
the authentication can take place.  The CoAP Simple Management Protocol (CSMP) is a 
protocol that may be used to appropriately configure the endpoints. 
Of further interest and note in the techniques presented herein include, for example: 
 The approaches that were described above do not alter the handshake.  Existing 
(D)TLS extensions may be overloaded to signal CA suppression without 
requiring a new ClientHello or a ServerHello. 
 Both a client and a server may ask a peer to suppress its CA certificates, not 
just, for example, the client. 
 More ways of signaling the omission of extra data in the handshake are 
proposed that go beyond just utilizing TLS nonces or the flags extension in the 
ClientHello. 
In summary, techniques presented herein minimize the authentication data that is 
transferred within encrypted tunnel handshakes where the data can introduce unacceptable 
slowness or failures in order to speed-up secure tunnel negotiations in constrained mediums 
in which numerous clients are "competing" to form secure connections to destination 
servers or endpoints.  Aspects of the presented techniques encompass, among other things, 
caching of a peer certificate chain and notifying (through various approaches that are 
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backwards compatible with existing implementations) a client or a server that they do not 
need to send an item because their peer already has that item cached. 
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